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Abstract
How do children infer the meanings of their first words? Even in infant-directed speech,
object nouns are often used in complex contexts with many possible referents and in
sentences with many other words. Previous work has argued that children can learn word
meanings via cross-situational observation of correlations between words their referents.
While cross-situational associations can sometimes be informative, social cues about what
a speaker is talking about can provide a powerful shortcut to word meaning. The current
study takes steps towards quantifying the informativeness of cues that signal speakers’
chosen referent, including their eye-gaze, the position of their hands, and the referents of
their previous utterances. We present results based on a hand-annotated corpus of 24
videos of child-caregiver play sessions with children from 6 to 18 months old, which we
make available to researchers interested in similar issues. Our analyses suggest that
although they can be more useful than cross-situational information in some contexts,
social and discourse information must also be combined probabilistically to be effective in
determining reference.
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Introduction
Imagine attending a dinner party where you don’t speak the language. Most of the
time you will likely have trouble understanding any aspect of the conversation. And of
course, if you don’t understand what is being talked about, you will also have a hard time
guessing the meanings of new words. In the flood of new sounds, many of which will be
functors like “of,” or “it” or even bound morphemes with no individual meaning of their
own, picking out consistent associations between sound sequences and their
meanings—abstract topics like “the upcoming elections in Germany”—will be difficult at
best.
There may be some opportunities when you can guess the topic of conversation,
however. If a guest indicates her dinner plate as she makes a comment to you, you might
infer that the topic is the food at the party, or perhaps even that one of the words she
used means “trout” (which you are both currently eating). Her prosody may even give
away her enthusiasm; combined with your knowledge of the etiquette of dinner parties,
you may be able to infer that she is giving a compliment. This physically-grounded
utterance, when paired with its clear prosodic structure and the direct social cue to its
referent, now presents an important learning opportunity. If this opportunity is supported
by a consistent pattern of co-occurrence between the word and its referent, you may be
able to map “trout” to trout and retain this mapping for future use.
While there are many differences between first- and second-language learning, there
are nevertheless important parallels between this example and the problem of word
learning for young children. If children are engaged in a joint activity or even a moment of
joint attention (as in our example), they can use this information to make inferences
about the speakers’ referential intentions and hence the meanings of words.
Theoretical accounts of early word learning emphasize the role of sharing attention
through social cues to joint attention (St. Augustine, 397/1963; Bloom, 2002; Clark,
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2003), and a wide variety of empirical evidence supports the view that children use signals
like the eye-gaze of speakers to infer what the speaker is talking about (Baldwin, 1993; M.
Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Hollich, Hirsh-Pasek, & Golinkoff, 2000). Our
recent computational work has elaborated this idea—that inferring the intentions of a
speaker can give a sophisticated word learner leverage in figuring out the meanings of the
words the speaker uses (Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009). In addition, a wide
variety of work has attempted to characterize the nature of caregiver-child interactions
and their links to language development (Bruner, 1975; M. Carpenter et al., 1998; Stern,
2002). However, there has been comparatively little work on the micro-structure of
referential cues: which particular cues matter to determining reference in an individual
social interaction.
Going back to our dinner party, a learner who assumes the guest’s utterance is about
the trout is making use of immediate social information about the speaker’s intentions:
that pointing is a signal of an intention to refer to some aspect of a particular object. But
another source of information is relevant as well: if a second guest speaks up immediately
afterwards, the learner could guess with some certainty that this remark also has to do
with the trout (or if not, at least the asparagus or the salad). This kind of aggregation of
information across time makes use of the continuity of discourse in conversation. If the
second guest’s remark had come an hour or even a minute after the first remark, the
learner would have had much more uncertainty about the second speaker’s topic.
Speech to children is highly repetitive and includes many partial repetitions of
phrases (Snow, 1972); this feature may be important for learning for a variety of reasons.
Repetition may allow more effective decoding of phonetic material that would otherwise
be difficult to decode (Bard & Anderson, 1983); it may also allow for the extraction of
structural regularities via minimal pairs in adjacent sentences (Onnis, Waterfall, &
Edelman, 2008). Work by Hoff-Ginsberg also has suggested that—for slightly older
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children at least—repetitions and reformulations are related to question-asking by parents,
a feature that positively predicts language outcomes in children months later
(Hoff-Ginsberg, 1986, 1990). Finally, this kind of partial repetition and reformulation has
also been argued to give a form of indirect negative evidence (Chouinard & Clark, 2003).
Another way to think about the perceived repetitiveness of child-directed speech is
that it creates supportive discourse contexts, in which even partial understanding can
nevertheless lead to identification of the topic (as in our example above). General
properties of discourse structure have been well-studied in psycholinguistics (P. Carpenter,
Miyake, & Just, 1995; Graesser, Millis, & Zwaan, 1997; Wolf & Gibson, 2006), but research
on word learning from the perspective of word-meaning mapping has largely neglected the
role of discourse. There has been some investigation of the role of the given/new
distinction for learning, e.g. Akhtar, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 1996 and Guerriero,
Oshima-Takane, & Kuriyama, 2006, but this discussion has not translated into widespread
appreciation for the role that discourse continuity might play in early word learning.
One measure of the relative under-appreciation of discourse factors comes from
recent computational work. Although many computational models use cross-situational
information about the co-occurrence of words and referents for word learning, nearly all of
these models assume that utterances are sampled independently from one another with
respect to time, throwing away important information about the order of utterances
(Siskind, 1996; Yu & Ballard, 2007; Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009).1
Recent experimental work has investigated adults’ and children’s abilities to make
1An important exception to this trend comes from a model by Roy and Pentland (2002), who used a
recurrence filter to take into account temporal contiguity in evidence for word-object mappings. Although
this work justified its choice in terms of the dynamics of short-term memory, rather than the structure of
discourse, it raises the interesting possibility that memory mechanisms may explain some aspects of the
temporal dynamics of word learning (Frank, Goldwater, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2010).
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cross-situational mappings between words and objects (Yu & Ballard, 2007; L. Smith &
Yu, 2008; Vouloumanos, 2008; Vouloumanos & Werker, 2009). These studies have found
that learners at all ages are able to learn associations between words and objects based on
consistent co-occurrence in individually ambiguous situations. Because these studies have
been focused on controlling for extraneous factors, they have largely randomized the order
of presentation of word-object pairings in their stimuli, intentionally removing any
information about discourse continuity. To date, only one study has focused on the effects
of temporal structure on mapping accuracy (Kachergis, Yu, & Shiffrin, 2010), finding that
temporal contiguity between instances of a pairing did aid word-object mapping. It seems
likely that this effect will be only more pronounced in richer, more naturalistic learning
situations.
Our goal in the work reported here is to investigate the utility of social cues and
discourse continuity for determining reference in child-directed speech. We conduct this
investigation from the perspective of an ideal observer (Marr, 1982; Geisler, 2003): we
hope to quantify the amount of information that can be brought to bear on the problem of
early word learning on the basis of both explicit social cues to intention and the continuity
of discourse via their contribution to determining intentions. This approach allows us to
understand the structure of environment in which early word learning proceeds and to
quantify the relative utility of different information sources for the learner (Yu & Ballard,
2007; Frank, Goodman, & Tenenbaum, 2009; K. Smith, Smith, & Blythe, in press).
Although the approach does not itself make claims about the use of these information
sources by human learners, such an analysis can be used to inform empirical studies of
word learning.
Although a detailed, realistic model of discourse might contain abstract topics like
“the quality of the food served in the main course,” in the current work we consider a
simplified version of talking about the same topic that may be more appropriate for young
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children: talking about the same object. Although this approach almost certainly omits a
good deal of abstract information about the kind of activity or action that the child and
caregiver are jointly involved in, it is more likely to include the kind of information
available to even the youngest word learner. In addition, it is easy to operationalize, and
does not require the development of a coding scheme for actions or intentions that goes
beyond the level of object categories. Finally, even for adults in a situation like our dinner
party, continuity of reference may be a more powerful cue than just continuity in topic.
Thus, in this initial descriptive work, we focus on reference continuity and use the terms
“continuity of reference” and “discourse” interchangeably.
Our current study follows work by Yu and Ballard (2007), who used an associative
model of word learning to integrate social and prosodic information with information
provided by the cross-situational co-occurrence of words and their referents. They
investigated these variables in a small hand-annotated corpus of videos from CHILDES
(MacWhinney, 2000) and found that performance was improved by the addition of both
social and prosodic information. Their work provides inspiration though our study is
broader in scope and somewhat different in aim. While they were interested in the
improvement in word learning that was brought by integrating social and prosodic cues,
here we make a direct attempt to characterize the structure of various social cues and
their potential contributions to determining the speaker’s intended referent.2
The method for our investigation is a corpus study. The approach of coding the
information available from videotapes of caregiver-child interaction allows us to analyze
2An influential body of work has suggested the utility of words as cues to other words’ meanings
(Gleitman, 1990; Fisher, 1994; Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer, 1999). Our focus was on the
beginnings of lexical acquisition, rather than the process of learning once some initial words are already
known, so we chose to focus on social and discourse information, since this information is likely available to
young learners prior to information about linguistic context.
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Figure 1. A sample frame from the FM corpus.
the learning environment directly, facilitating our ideal observer approach. A limitation of
this type of study, however, is that it does not measure what information learners are able
to extract from a particular learning environment. There are many possible reasons why a
particular source of information might not be exploited, including learners’ biases or even
basic cognitive limitations on memory and attention. But our hope is that by pursing this
ideal observer approach, the measurements we conduct will motivate future work on the
abilities of children in comparable learning situations.
The plan of the paper is as follows. We first introduce the corpus we studied. We
next discuss the reliability of cross-situational statistics in this corpus, as a motivation for
our future analyses. We then discuss social cues and discourse continuity as sources of
information about speakers’ intentions. We conclude by using a supervised classifier to
investigate how much information about speakers’ referential intentions can jointly be
extracted from these information sources with a simple model of cue combination.
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics for each file in the FM corpus. Obj = object, utt = utterance.
Age Grp Code # Gend Age Utts Length Obj types Objs/utt Word tokens Word tokens/utt
6mos 31 M 6 238 14:48 10 1.26 912 3.83
32 F 6 142 12:08 9 1.56 713 5.02
33 M 6 257 11:32 12 2.28 974 3.79
35 F 6 224 14:51 9 1.95 1232 5.50
36 F 6 109 5:41 14 1.27 396 3.63
38 M 6 85 7:32 6 2.28 315 3.71
39 F 6 158 11:03 5 1.85 722 4.57
40 M 6 244 15:28 8 2.66 845 3.46
12mos 28 M 11 296 14:49 7 2.30 949 3.21
2 M 12 288 17:06 7 1.84 1252 4.35
3 M 12 336 21:29 8 2.23 1279 3.81
4 M 12 154 11:18 6 2.93 476 3.09
8 F 12 145 13:16 21 1.93 572 3.94
12 F 14 56 2:53 3 1.18 180 3.21
14 M 14 65 4:14 9 1.25 216 3.32
16 F 14 155 8:37 5 1.25 660 4.26
18mos 17 F 18 197 10:02 4 2.00 746 3.79
18 M 18 232 10:19 5 1.95 801 3.45
26 F 18 189 12:18 4 1.80 704 3.72
29 M 18 178 10:14 5 1.60 646 3.63
22 M 19 120 11:59 17 1.94 427 3.56
19 F 20 397 12:40 4 2.00 1339 3.37
20 F 20 266 15:31 9 1.91 1075 4.04
21 M 20 232 22:00 9 1.57 1030 4.44
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Corpus Materials
For our analyses, we chose our corpus based on two criteria. First, a potential
corpus needed to include video as well as audio so that we could accurately identify both
the speaker’s referents and the other objects present in the physical context. Second, the
corpus needed to be collected in a restricted enough context that it would be feasible to
code the entire set of plausible referents for a word, so that the set of alternative referents
for a word could be considered.
We selected a corpus which fulfilled these requirements: a set of videos of
object-centered play between mothers and children in their homes, collected by Fernald
and Morikawa (1993). Although the original study considered videos of American and
Japanese mothers, in the current study we only made use of the American data. The
children in these videos fell into three age groups: 6 months (N=8, 4 males), 11 – 14
months (N=8, 5 males), and 18 – 20 months (N=8, 4 males). All families were Caucasian.
The corpus was collected by a pair of female observers who made visits to the homes
of participants and audio- and video-recorded mother-child dyads as they played. After an
introductory period, sets of standardized toy pairs were introduced, including a stuffed
dog and pig, a wooden car and truck, and a brush and a box. The mother was given each
pair of toys for 3 – 5 minutes and asked to play “as she normally would.” Although all
three toy pairs were given to all dyads, several dyads also played with other toys that were
present in the home. Towards the end of the session, to elicit multiple productions of each
of the object names, the experimenter asked the mother to hide several of the objects and
request that the child search for them. Although the original study made use of only 5
minutes of data from each video (due to the particular aims of the study), we coded all
available data on play centered around pairs of objects. Descriptive data for the corpus
are given in Table 1. Participant codes are included so that readers can reference the raw
data (hyperlink provided below).
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For the purposes of the current study, we made the decision not use data from the
hiding game at the end of each video. We made this decision for several reasons. First,
and most importantly, the use of referential cues was quite different in this context.
Although these differences might potentially be of interest, the game was usually quite
short (hence there was not enough data to analyze separately). Second, one of our goals
was to study the efficacy of social cues in a relatively restrictive context. The hiding game
is an example of a case where social cues have a complex relationship to reference: one
that you can only appreciate if you understand the nature of the shared task (to find
something that we can’t see). Accordingly, we believe our basic analyses of social cues are
inappropriate in this kind of context. Finally, the hiding game was not performed for the
six-month-olds, so its inclusion would compromise comparisons across age groups.
Coding
For each utterance we first coded the toys present in the field of view of the learner
at the time of the utterance. Over the course of the video, the union of these sets of toys
form the total set of possible object referents for our analyses.3 A sample frame from the
videos is shown in Figure 1. The only toy judged to be in the field of view of the child at
the time of the utterance most proximate to this frame was the dog. We also coded, for
each utterance, the object or objects in the context that were being looked at, held, and
pointed to by the mother. These cues were sparse: in many cases, no object was being
looked at, held, or pointed to and so these fields were marked “none.” This method of
3The assumption not to include objects like the child’s shoes, the rug, the furniture, etc. is of course a
simplifying assumption. But all of the other objects in the scene (aside from the experimentally-manipulated
toy sets) generally remain present throughout the entire videos. That does not mean that they cannot be
discourse referents—it simply means that they must be pointed out explicitly and introduced into the
discourse. In the current study, we limited our coding of objects to those objects that actually were referents
in the discourses we coded.
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coding was chosen because it was practical for the large amount of video data we were
working with (a total of approximately 5 hours of video).4
One potential downside of this coding method is that it does not make use of the
temporal coordination between, e.g., eye-gaze and language production (Griffin & Bock,
2000). The use of eye-tracking during natural interaction is outside of the scope of the
current study and may prove difficult more generally (but c.f. Merin, Young, Ozonoff, &
Rogers, 2007; Gredeba¨ck, Fikke, & Melinder, 2010; Franchak, Kretch, Soska, Babcock, &
Adolph, 2011). In addition, a child observing a caregiver’s eyes during natural interaction
may be only slightly more accurate in identifying the object of their eye-gaze than an
observer who has multiple opportunities to code the same gaze from video. Nevertheless,
if technical methods are developed that allow for the automated collection of this kind of
data, such data would enable comparisons with the current dataset, something that we
believe should be a goal for future work.
Though the data arguably are not a part of the same ideal observer analysis, we also
coded two other cues: the object or objects that were being looked at or held by the child.
We refer to these information sources as “attentional cues” in the sense that they are
information sources for our ideal observer analysis that can help us determine reference.
In this initial exploratory analysis, we treat them similarly to social cues produced by the
mothers in our study. Although this comparison may make attentional and social factors
appear superficially more similar than they actually are, we believe it is important to
assess the utility of these attentional factors, an issue to which we return in the General
4Note that coders had access to the audio at the same time as they annotated social cues. While this
meant that they could conceivably be biased towards increasing the accuracy of cues, it would have been
difficult for them to synchronize their codes with individual utterances otherwise. Though a technical
solution could be found for this issue, given the results reported below we do not believe that bias in favor
of cue accuracy was likely to be a major issue. In addition, any bias would apply across cues (allowing us
to interpret the relative differences between cues).
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Discussion.
We next coded the speaker’s intended referent for each utterance. We coded an
utterance as referring to an object when the utterance contained either the name of the
object or a pronoun referring to that object. For example, in a sentence like “look at the
doggie,” the intended referent would clearly be to talk about the dog. Likewise, in an
utterance like “look at his eyes and ears,” (where the caregiver was pointing at the dog),
the referential intention would also be the dog—though the coder would need to make
reference to the videotape to determine the pronoun reference. We did not specifically
mark the use of property terms like “red,” super-/subordinate terms like “animal” or
“poodle,” or part terms like “eye,” instead simply coding their object referent in the
current discourse. Exclamations like “oh” were not judged to be referential, even if they
were directed at an object. Objects that were not present were still judged to be intended
referents, e.g., “do you like the doggie” would still be judged to have the referent dog even
if the child could not see a dog or a dog was not present in the scene at all.
In order to evaluate the reliability of our hand-coding scheme, a second coder
produced independent annotations for two representative videos. We then calculated a
single value of Cohen’s κ (a measure of reliability in an n-alternative decision that corrects
for chance guessing of frequent options, see Table 2 for data). Since coders were free to
assign multiple objects to each coded category, we assumed that utterances for which
multiple objects were indicated for a particular category contained multiple opportunities
for agreement. This assumption gave the opportunity for “partial credit” in the case that
e.g. one rater assumed that both the dog and the pig were being looked at by the mother,
the other assumed that only the dog was being looked at. While reliabilities were high
(around .8) for the objects being referred to, mother’s hands, points, and child’s points,
they were considerably lower (in the range of .5) for ratings of the objects looked at by the
mother and child. (There may be many causes of this lower reliability, from the relative
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Table 2
Values of Cohen’s κ for coding of corpus features.
Cue κ
Intended referent .83
Mother’s eyes .47
Mother’s hands .80
Mother’s points .77
Child’s eyes .55
Child’s hands .83
difficulty of assessing eye-gaze from video of this type to the issue of how to code the
temporal coordination of eye-gaze and speech). We consider how the lower reliabilities
might affect our analysis in subsequent sections.
All in all, the end product of this coding effort was a corpus of approximately 5k
utterances and 18k words, for which each utterance was annotated with the objects
present in the field of view of the learner, the intended referent(s) of the speaker, and the
social and attentional cues given by the mother and child. The annotated transcripts for
this corpus are available at: http://langcog.stanford.edu/materials/FMcorpus.html.
A short excerpt from the corpus is given in Appendix A.
Cross-situational associations
We begin our analysis of the corpus data described above by considering the
problem of a word learner attempting to map labels to objects. For all of the objects in
the three consistent toy pairings used in the corpus (dog/pig, car/truck, and brush/box),
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we computed the total probability of a co-occurrence between each object and the
corresponding words (“dog” / “doggie”, “pig” / “piggie” etc.), both for each participant
and for the corpus as a whole. We did this by calculating Pco−occur = C(w)/C(o), where
C(w) was the count of utterances containing relevant word tokens and C(o) was the count
of utterances where the relevant object was present. Results for the entire corpus are
shown in Figure 2.
The primary finding of this analysis was that the toy pairs were truly ambiguous in
their co-occurrence with the relevant lexical items: “pig” was heard almost exactly as
many times with the dog toy as it was with the pig toy. This finding held true across
individuals and across toys. There were very slight trends towards greater associations
between toys and their correct labels, but they were nowhere near the level that would
likely be needed for even the most sensitive statistical learning system.5
Because the procedure for data collection for the corpus involved distributing pairs
of toys to caregivers, we assumed that there would be some degree of ambiguity in the
co-occurrences between words and toys, but we were nevertheless struck by a mismatch
between the degree of ambiguity shown in this analysis and the overall impression from
the video footage that accompanies our corpus (see e.g. the sample video available along
with the corpus transcripts). Although the analysis above shows almost perfect ambiguity
between toys in a pair, the impression given from the videos is that very few utterances
are truly ambiguous. Instead, the parents in the sample take care to avoid referential
ambiguity. This impression is confirmed by the high reliability of coders’ estimates of
what the mother’s intended referent is. Had there been true referential ambiguity in the
corpus, agreement would be much lower.
The mismatch between our na¨ıve cross-situational analysis and the human-coded
5We return to this issue in the general discussion, when we discuss the results of a cross-situational word
learning model that was recently evaluated on this corpus.
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Figure 2. A heatmap showing co-occurrence probabilities between words and objects, across
the entire corpus. Lighter colored squares indicate higher probabilities (with probabilities
marked within each square).
referents form the motivation for the analyses that follow. Using the corpus annotations,
we investigate in detail how it is that human coders disambiguate the speaker’s intended
referent reliably for nearly every sentence.
Social and attentional cues
The goal of the following analyses is to measure the efficacy of social and attentional
cues in revealing what objects the mothers were referring to. We first use descriptive
analyses to understand the basic distribution of cues across objects for children in the
different age groups. We then examine the timecourse of these cues across utterances in
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Figure 3. Precision and recall for each cue relative to its value in recovering the mother’s
intended reference in the corresponding utterance. Each dot shows the value for a single
dyad, while blue triangles show mean precision and red squares show mean recall. Points
are jittered slightly on the horizontal axis to avoid overplotting.
the discourse.
Signal detection analyses
We began by measuring the utility of each cue in predicting object reference
independently. We chose the framework of signal-detection theory as our base for
constructing these measures, treating each cue as a predictor to the signal (object
reference). Imagine a cue like the mother’s looking at objects (referred to as “mother’s
eyes”). If, for a particular utterance, a look correctly signals the object being talked about,
this is counted as a “hit.” If an object is talked about but not looked at, this utterance is
classified as a “miss.” If an object is looked at to but not referred to, it is a “false alarm.”
From these measures, we calculated two standard scores for summarizing
performance. The first was “precision” (hits / hits + false alarms) and the second was
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“recall” (hits / hits + misses.6 precision measures the proportion of the time when the
cue was correct, while recall measures the proportion of opportunities for detecting an
intended referent when the cue was present. These two measures can be combined into a
single number, F0 (their harmonic mean) for easy comparison.
For example, imagine a case where a mother says “look at the doggie” while looking
at the dog, then says “you like the doggie,” and looks at the child. In the third utterance,
she says “he’s so furry,” and continues looking at the child. In the fourth, she says “you
want to play with something else?” and looks back at the dog. In this hypothetical corpus
with only four utterances, one cue and one object, we can demonstrate the use of each of
our measures. In the first sentence, looking at the dog is counted as a hit. In the second,
looking at the child (but not the dog) is a miss. The third is another miss, and the fourth,
where she looks at the dog but doesn’t refer to it, is a false alarm. Thus, the precision is 1
hit / (1 hit + 1 false alarm) = .50. The F-score is thus approximately .40 (the harmonic
mean of .33 and .50), and the recall of the mother’s eyes as a cue to reference in this case
is 1 hit / (1 hit + 2 misses) = .33. In this example, paying attention to the mother’s eyes
to figure out her intended referent would not be a good idea.
Results of the signal detection analysis for the broader corpus are plotted in Figure
3 and mean values are given in Table 3. The majority of cues had approximately equal
precision and recall (with values centered around .45). Among these, the child’s eyes had
the best F -score, while the child’s hands had the worst. The only major exception to this
trend was the mother’s pointing, which had a very low recall but high precision.
Caregivers’ points are relatively few and far between, even in the kind of context that
would be most open to ostenstive word teaching. But when these points are present, they
are very strong and reliable cues that a particular object is being talked about.
6These measures are also referred to as “completeness” and “accuracy.”
Social and discourse information for reference 19
Table 3
Precision, recall, and F-scores for all cues.
Cue Precision Recall F-score
Mother’s eyes .55 .36 .43
Mother’s hands .42 .49 .44
Mother’s points .78 .10 .14
Child’s eyes .49 .62 .54
Child’s hands .43 .41 .38
Discourse continuity .53 .52 .53
To test for developmental trends in the F -score of each of these cues, we constructed
simple regressions predicting F -score as a function of age. The only predictor that
increased significantly with age was the mother’s eyes (β = .27, p = .005), with a trend
towards a developmental increase in the reliability of the child’s eyes as well (β = .46,
p = .08).
Looking-related cues for both the mother and the child were relatively good
predictors among the group, despite the low inter-coder reliability shown by annotations
of this factor. Several interpretations of this result are possible. One is that these cues are
even more informative with respect to the speaker’s reference, but that they are hard to
code from video and hence errors in coding lowered their informativeness in our analysis.
Another, contrasting interpretation is that these cues had low reliability because only
some looking behavior is truly meaningful as a signal of reference. On this account, other
behavior—scanning the scene, monitoring the other conversational participant—is both
difficult to code reliably and relatively uninformative with respect to reference. A third
possible explanation is that the difficulty that our coders had in identifying looking
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behavior is actually somewhat reflective of the general difficulty of extracting the
moment-to-moment location of another person’s gaze. While in any given instant it may
be easy to determine where someone is looking, it is extremely unusual (and socially
aversive) to engage in continuous monitoring of another person’s eyes. We believe that
this issue is best resolved by future work, perhaps using techniques like eye-tracking or
head-mounted cameras in order to determine the availability of gaze-related information
to learners in the moment (Aslin, 2009; Yoshida & Smith, 2008).
Summarizing this analysis, individual social and attentional cues were noisy and did
not fully disambiguate the referential ambiguity between toys. Most cues were present
often but correct half or less than half the time, while pointing was rare but correct much
more of the time that it was present. In the current dataset, individual social and
attentional cues were not alone sufficient for the determination of reference. To make more
accurate guesses, learners must do some kind of extra processing or integration of this
information.
Timecourse analyses
The goal of these analyses was to explore temporal dynamics in the cues we
measured. In particular, we were interested in whether some were used more often at the
beginning of talking about objects. To perform this analysis, for each age group we
aggregated all the examples of discourses–continuous runs of talking about an object. We
defined a discourse to be three continuous references to an object—though results did not
change qualitatively when we explored other reasonable values for this number. We
aligned each of these discourses and averaged the social cues for the object that was being
referred to. There were 88, 110, and 107 such discourses for the 6-, 12-, and
18-month-olds, respectively. Since relatively few lasted longer than 5 or 10 utterances,
data were too sparse to calculate cue probabilities accurately for longer discourses.
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Figure 4. Each plot shows the probability of a particular social cue being present, plotted
by the number of utterances a particular object had been talked about. Empirical data are
shown with a solid line and the best linear fit to these data are shown with a dashed line.
Significant linear trends are shown with a star. Each row of plots shows an age group and
each column of plots shows a particular social cue.
Therefore, we excluded lengths for which we had fewer than 10 datapoints. Results are
plotted in Figure 4.
For each time-course trend we performed a simple linear regression. We found that
the probability of use for all cues stayed constant or decreased; no cues increased
significantly in frequency (though there was an interesting trend in this direction for
pointing cues in the 18-month-olds). The probability of the mother’s eyes being on the
object stayed relatively constant for all age groups except 18-month-olds, for whom it
decreased slightly over time. The same result held true for the mother’s hands. Though
the base rate of the mother pointing to the object was low to begin with, the probability
of a point decreased considerably for both the 6- and 12-month-olds as an object was
talked about more. Interestingly, that generalization did not hold for the 18-month-olds;
our viewing of the videos suggests that the mothers of older children were using points to
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pick out subordinate features of the objects. The probability of the child looking at the
object also decreased as the object was talked about more, perhaps due to boredom; this
trend was significant for the two older age groups but trended in the same direction for
the younger children. Finally, the probability of the child’s hands on the object stayed
relatively constant.
The major result of this analysis is that points appear to be used to introduce new
discourse topics. Although they are infrequent, they are more frequent at the beginning of
discourses about objects for young children. A learner who identified a point would thus
do well to assume that the object being pointed to is the topic of discourse for the next
several utterances topic, if the discourse topic did not shift. In the next set of analyses we
investigate this strategy by measuring the dynamics of topic shifting in our sample of
child-directed speech.
Discourse information
The next goal of our study was to quantify the role of continuity of discourse (here
defined as continuity of reference) in predicting what objects caregivers were referring to.
In this section we first develop a visualization of reference in child-directed speech. We
next show some descriptive results about the magnitude and temporal dynamics of
reference continuity. Finally, we end by comparing reference continuity to the social cues
examined above using the same signal detection analyses.
Visualizing continuity of reference
The first step we took towards understanding the prevalence of discourse continuity
was to visualize the results of coding the speakers’ intended referent. We introduce what
we call a “Gleitman plot”: a visualization of a stretch of discourse based on (1) what
objects are present and (2) what objects are being talked about. We have chosen this
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Figure 5. Example Gleitman plot. Each row represents an object, each column represents
an utterance. A blue mark denotes that the object was present when the utterance was
uttered but not mentioned; a green mark denotes that the object was mentioned but not
present; and a red mark denotes that the object was present and mentioned. Horizontal
stretches of red marks indicate continuous sets of utterances referring to a particular object
that was visible to the child.
name because Gleitman (1990) was concerned with the relationship between what is
present in a learner’s experience and what is being talked about; we believe our plotting
method provides insight into this question.
A representative Gleitman plot for one mother-child dyad in the corpus is shown in
Figure 5. Rows show references to individual objects over time, such that an object that is
present is shown in blue; one that is talked about is shown in green, and one that is
present and talked about is in red. This view of the corpus allows us to examine trends in
the timecourse of reference and to visualize a complex set of data in a compact form. For
example, it shows us at a glance that the corpus interactions were structured around pairs
of objects, since the interaction can be divided into sets of twin stripes for the pig/dog,
truck/car, brush/box, and a short segment on the book/ball.
We can draw two anecdotal conclusions on the basis of viewing the Gleitman plots
for each mother-child dyad in the corpus. First, within the corpora we studied, mothers
talk primarily about objects that are present in the field of view of the children. This can
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be seen by examining the small amount of green within the plots. Unsurprisingly, for a
word learner guessing the meaning of a novel noun, the best guess will likely be that the
word refers to an object that is present (Pinker, 1989; Yu & Smith, 2007; Siskind, 1996).
(Although this generalization may be true for nouns, it is much less likely to be true for
verbs; Gleitman, 1990). Of course, the generality of this conclusion is limited by the
restricted task that the mothers in our sample were asked to perform.
Second, we can see clear evidence of discourse continuity (again, defined as
continuity of reference). For example, in Figure 5, rather than being distributed evenly
throughout the span of time when an object is present, references to an object are
“clumpy”: they cluster together in bouts of reference to a single object followed by a
switch to a different object. This can be seen for example in the dog / pig portion (first
45 utterances), where the mother alternates several times between the two objects, talking
about each for several utterances before switching.
Measuring reference continuity
In our visualizations, we observed clumps of references to a particular object rather
than a more uniform distribution of references over time. To quantify this trend, we first
defined a quantitative measure of reference continuity, PRC : the probability of referring to
a particular object, given that it was talked about in the previous utterance. We go into
some detail about how this measure was calculated in order to be clear about how we
calculated our baseline measure, since an appropriate baseline is crucial for determining
whether PRC is greater than chance.
For an object o, we defined the reference function Rt(o) as a delta function
returning whether or not that object was referred to at time t. We then define PRC(o)
(the probability of reference continuity for a particular object):
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Figure 6. Probability of reference continuity (Prc) for each child, shown in age order on
the horizontal axis. Box with error bars shows 95% confidence intervals for a permuted
baseline.
PRC(o) =
∑
t
Rt(o)Rt−1(o)∑
t
Rt(o)
(1)
We calculated PRC(o) for each object for the times when it was present in the physical
context. We then took an average of PRC(o) over all objects, weighted by the frequency of
each object, to produce an average value for each dyad.
We then estimated a baseline value for PRC via permutation analysis. Intuitively,
this analysis asks what a “chance” value for PRC would be if utterances were completely
independent of one another. This analysis is important because the distribution of
individual objects is very uneven in time and some objects are more likely to be talked
about than others. We calculated this baseline value for each dyad in the corpus by
recomputing PRC(o) for 10,000 random permutations of the times at which each object
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was talked about.7 For the Gleitman plots in Figure 5, this analysis would be represented
by randomly shuﬄing all the red and blue squares in each row so that the same overall set
of squares were red and blue but their ordering was different.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 6. As predicted based on our
visualizations, PRC was outside of the 95% confidence interval on chance for all but 3 of
the 24 dyads. A simple linear regression showed no relationship between PRC and age
(r2 = 0.01, p = .56). Thus, it appears that reference is considerably more continuous than
would be expected by chance in child-directed play situations of the type in our corpus.
Put another way, repeated reference is on average 1.8 times as likely as expected by
chance.
Note that this baseline is very dependent on the number of objects that are present.
With a mode of two objects present, the baseline calculation is as conservative as possible.
The results that discourses are significantly more continuous than expected by
chance—even in the extremely restricted experimental situation for our corpus—suggests
that in a noisier environment, discourse continuity could be an even more powerful cue. In
other words, in the absence of other information about what is being talked about, a good
bet for a child is that mom is still talking about the same thing she was a moment ago.
Temporal properties of reference
We next examined the temporal properties of discourse: how the recency of mention
for an object affects whether it will be talked about again. This analysis can be thought of
as a generalization of the analysis above; the new analysis asks about the probability of an
object being talked about given that it was referred to some number of utterances ago.
7Excluding utterances during which an object was not present was important in calculating an accurate
baseline; had we permuted all utterances, we would have artificially deflated the baseline by spreading
references to o across the entire conversation even when o was not present.
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Figure 7. Probability of reference given that an object was referred to n utterances ago,
where n is plotted on the horizontal axis.
We conducted the first analysis simply by calculating a generalization of PRC for each
child-caregiver dyad. This new measure, PnRC , gives the probability of an object being
referred to, given that it was referred to n utterances ago. Thus, PRC is the same as P 1RC ,
and we calculate it via an aggregation across objects, as before:
P tRC(o) =
∑
t
Rt(o)Rt−n(o)∑
t
Rt(o)
(2)
The result of this analysis are plotted in Figure 7. It is clear from this visualization
that very recent utterances are disproportionately correlated with the probability of
referring again—this observation summarizes the previous analysis. The influence of a
particular object in discourse declines slowly, however.
We quantified this property by fitting two functions to the resulting data: an
exponential and a power-law function. Both functions were fit by adjusting two
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parameters (intercept and decay) in order to minimize mean squared error. We found that
the power-law (MSE = .14) fit considerably better than the exponential function (MSE =
.75). The key portion of the curve on which the power law gave better fit was the sharp
initial decrease from a very high probability of referring again to a much lower one a few
utterances later.
This dynamic may be due to the more general phenomenon of power-law decays in
human memory (Anderson & Schooler, 1990), or comparable dynamics governing
discourse topics (e.g. boredom or shifting attention). Recent work has also found similar
distributions for word frequency repeats in much larger corpora, though this work
suggested that with more data it was possible to distinguish a power law from a stretched
exponential distribution (Altmann, Pierrehumbert, & Motter, 2009). Thus, our
conclusions about the specific form of the distribution here are tentative. Regardless, this
pattern clearly shows a slow drop-off in the probability of bringing up a
previously-mentioned referent, suggesting that a learner who takes this bias towards
previously-mentioned references into account will make better guesses about the current
referent.
Signal detection analysis
We conducted the same analysis for discourse continuity as a cue to reference as we
did for each social cue. We analyzed the precision, recall, and F-score for the scenario in
which the learner guesses that a particular utterance will refer to the same object that the
utterance before did. Results are plotted alongside the social cues in Figure 3. We found
that discourse continuity had an average F-score comparable to knowing what the child
was looking at. In other words, a learner with perfect information about previous referents
would do as well guessing the current reference based on continuity as they would based
on the most informative social /attentional cue. This analysis confirms the results of the
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Figure 8. Classifier performance on those utterances for which there was an intention to
refer to an object by cues used in classification. Error bars show standard error of the mean
across all children. “mot” = mother’s social cues, “chi” = child’s social cues, and “disc” =
discourse cues.
reference continuity analyses above, demonstrating again that discourse
information—when available—can be quite useful in guessing speakers’ intended referent.
Joint classification analysis
The goal of our final analysis was to measure how well an observer could guess
which object a speaker was talking about, given the information available in the social,
attentional, and discourse cues just discussed. The idea behind this analysis is to use a
supervised classification scheme to provide some measure of the total information available
in these cues.
In order to carry out our supervised classification analysis, we used a Na¨ıve Bayes
classifier (a standard technique in statistical machine learning; see e.g., Hastie, Tibshirani,
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& Friedman, 2001) to combine each of the cues in order to make a judgment about what
object was being talked about. This classifier has the advantage of being simple and
computationally efficient, although it makes the assumption that all cues are conditionally
independent from each other. We use a method that makes this assumption—rather than
a more sophisticated method that naturally exploits mutual information between cues—in
order to explore whether the information sources in our corpus were in fact truly
independent (something which might be hidden in the operation of a more sophisticated
classifier).
Our classifier was a standard Na¨ıve Bayes classifier:
p(O|C1, ..., Cn) = 1
Z
p(O)
∏
i
p(Ci|O) (3)
where O denotes the object being talked about in a particular utterance (or “none”), Ci
denotes a particular social cue, and Z is a constant scaling factor. The Na¨ıve Bayes
classifier decomposes the posterior probability of an object into two terms: a prior and a
likelihood. The term p(O) is the prior, denoting the baseline probability (frequency) of a
particular object being referred to; the term p(Ci|O) is the likelihood of the cue given the
object.
Because many mother-child dyads played with somewhat different sets of objects
(and also to ensure the generality of our results), we constructed a separate classifier for
each mother-child dyad. The classifiers were evaluated using a tenfold cross-validation
scheme in order to ensure that results were not due to overfitting. Results reported here
are averaged across all ten test sets.8
Figure 8 shows the results of this analysis. The baseline probability of reference to
an object (calculated as the proportion of utterances with a coded intention that was not
8We experimented with a simple logistic regression as well as regression-classification trees and found
highly similar results for both alternative techniques.
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“none”) was relatively low in all three groups (6-month-olds, .60; 12-month-olds, .52;
18-month-olds, .50). We therefore report classification performance only for those
sentences which had an intended referent. We evaluate classifiers created by fully crossing
three sources of information: social cues exhibited by the mother, including eyes, hands,
and pointing; markers of the child’s attention, including the child’s eyes and hands; and
discourse cues. All classifiers included baseline information about which objects were
present in the field of view of the child. We did not find systematic age-related differences
in classifier accuracy, so we consolidated data across all 24 dyads.
For all dyads, baseline performance was low, indicating that the physical presence of
objects was not enough to predict reference effectively. While mothers often referred to
objects that were present, sometimes they did not, and they also sometimes referred to
objects that were not present (Gleitman, 1990). Adding social/attentional information
(whether social cues from the mother or attentional cues from the child) nearly doubled
classifier accuracy. Adding discourse information also resulted in a boost in classification
accuracy, though not quite as large as that caused by adding social/attentional
information.
Combining any two information sources resulted in an additional boost, but adding
the third did not add any additional accuracy. This result suggests that cues were
non-independent: there was overlapping information about reference between the different
sets of cues (hence the gain from having both was less than the classifier gain expected by
having only one or the other). In the case of the mother/child cue interaction, it seems
likely that this overlap is due to cases of joint attention in which both participants are
directly focused on a single object. The interaction between the child’s attention and
discourse continuity is less clear but may suggest that children’s attention in this task is
“sticky,” staying on the current focus of conversation and switching more gradually than
the mother’s attention. Overall performance with all information sources was 61.5%,
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suggesting that even with imperfect information, there are many utterances for which
social information suffices for the identification of the speaker’s intended referent.
Summarizing this analysis, social cues and discourse together represent overlapping
sources of information for determining what is being talked about. Taken together, these
information sources (as captured by our coding) were far from perfect but nevertheless
allowed for relatively good guesses about the topic of an utterance without any additional
linguistic information.
General Discussion
The goal of this study was to measure the contributions of various sources of
non-linguistic information to determining reference—what object a speaker is talking
about—in child-directed speech. To address this question we introduced a corpus of videos
of child-directed speech across a range of ages, which we annotated with information
about the objects visible to the child, the speakers’ intended referent, and the various
social interactions of the child and caregiver with the objects. We found that, with the
exception of pointing, social cues like eye-gaze and hand position were at best noisy
indicators of reference, and that no individual cue revealed the speaker’s referent more
than a portion of the time, even in this highly constrained corpus. Discourse continuity
(the assumption that the speaker was talking about the same thing as in their previous
utterance) provided an additional source of information about what was being talked
about that was as reliable as any of these individual cues. A final set of simulations with a
supervised classifier suggested that, despite their overlap, aggregating information across
these information sources together provided a better—though still imperfect—estimate of
the speakers’ intended referent.
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Limitations
The current study has a number of limitations. Each of these was exposed in the
process of conducting this descriptive study, and might not have been obvious without the
effort taken to develop a coding scheme for the factors of interest. Although each may
limit the strength of the generalizations possible from this particular study, we hope that
each also points the way towards future work.
First, in order to make the coding task tractable across the relatively large corpus
we used, it was important to break down the data at a relatively coarse temporal
granularity. As a consequence, although we attempted to capture any look made to an
object, our coding necessarily neglected some of the quick temporal dynamics of
caregivers’ and children’s eye-movements—as shown by the relatively low inter-coder
reliability of our eye-movement coding. We hope that future work will use technical
advances such as head cameras and eye-tracking to make more direct estimates of
children’s visual environment and the availability of social information from observed
eye-gaze (Aslin, 2009; Yoshida & Smith, 2008).
Second, we have spoken throughout our analyses as though complex physical
gestures can be individuated into discrete “cues” which can easily be associated with a
particular utterance. This approximation will almost certainly miss nuances of gestural
communication (for example, anecdotally, caregivers in our sample often moved the object
they were holding and talking about more than one that they were not talking about), but
this approximation was necessary to code the volume of data reported here. Technical
advances such as motion capture or motion recognition from computer vision may provide
some traction on these questions (L. Smith, Yu, & Pereira, 2009).
Finally, we have equated an eye-movement by the caregiver (which may or may not
be visible to the child) with an eye-movement by the child (which controls what is visible
to him or her). From the perspective of the child, this equivalence is not valid: the child’s
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own eye-movements control what is being looked at, while the adult’s eye-movements
constitute an ephemeral signal to another person’s attention. Nevertheless, in order to
understand the relative validity of the child’s own attention compared with external social
information, we believe it is important to include these cues. In fact, the relative
informativeness of what the child looks at and touches may provide support for a
hypothesized egocentric belief: that words refer to aspects of the child’s own perceptual
experiences rather than signaling the speaker’s referential intentions (Baron-Cohen,
Baldwin, & Crowson, 1997; Hollich et al., 2000). Since there is significant cultural
variation in the amount that caregivers accommodate their labeling behavior to children,
future work on this topic should sample across a wider range of cultural and
socio-economic contexts (e.g. Ochs, 1988; Hart & Risley, 1995; Fernald, 2010).
Conclusions
In studies of the role of social cognition in language learning, researchers tend to
manipulate the presence or absence of social information. When this manipulation results
in a significant difference in the child’s reasoning about or retention of a word, we assume
that a particular cue is a viable source of information or even one that is particularly
important for word learning. But these inferences may not always be warranted. Our
study takes a first step towards measuring the microstructure of cue presence “in the
wild.” From this perspective, the single most important insight from this study is that no
individual cue would consistently allow an observer of our corpus to infer what the
speaker was talking about. Instead, an efficient learner would do far better by combining
social information sources and aggregating this information over time—treating speakers’
behavior as signals from a noisy source—than they would by monitoring any particular
cue.
A simple view of this process is that social cues each could provide a probabilistic
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filter for possible referents. Since recent work suggests that children are able to use
co-occurrence to link words to referents (Yu & Ballard, 2007; L. Smith & Yu, 2008;
Vouloumanos, 2008; Vouloumanos & Werker, 2009), this kind of “filtering” account would
be a way for learners to integrate cross-situational and social information. Both
experimental (Baldwin, 1993; Akhtar et al., 1996) and computational (Yu & Ballard,
2007) studies suggest cross-situational evidence is more effective when supplemented with
social information.
But perhaps cross-situational and social learning are not separate proceses at all
(Frank, Goodman, Tenenbaum, & Fernald, 2009). Perhaps the kind of “statistical
learning” that is seen in cross-situational word learning experiments actually operates over
fundamentally social representations. A statistical word learner trying to interpret an
utterance may be balancing uncertainty about the speaker’s intended referent (or even,
intended meaning) with uncertainty about what words themselves mean. This kind of
“communicative inference” proposal would suggest that social cues are not a filtering step
prior to a cross-situational analysis. Instead, they are a fundamental part of the inference
itself.
Our recent work implements such a model, in which the relative weights of social
cues are learned jointly along with word-object mappings, and assesses it on the corpus
described here (Johnson, Demuth, & Frank, 2012). While word learning performance on
the corpus is still far from perfect, the model performs especially well at the
utterance-by-utterance process of identifying the speaker’s intended referent (the topic of
our study here). Most notably, this system learns the probabilities that the various social
cues in the corpus are signaling reference—replicating the descriptive analyses reported
here in a completely unsupervised learner.
The analysis presented here points to a distinction between two different
conceptions of early word learning: one in which different sources of information like
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cross-situational statistics and social cues are independent (a “filtering” model), and one
in which they are joint (a “communicative inference” model). Distinguishing these two
conceptions will not be easy. But the development of tools for analyzing the
microstructure of children’s social input will be a critical step along the way.
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Appendix A: Corpus Excerpt
We include a brief excerpt from the first session in our corpus (from a 12-month-old,
A2). M and C refer to mother and child respectively. We have removed punctuation for
purposes of automated analysis and comparison.
Utterance Objects Referent M eye M hand C eye C hand M point
is that the doggy dog pig dog none none pig none none
you see the doggy dog pig dog dog none pig none none
theres the doggy dog pig dog dog none dog pig none
thats a pig dog pig pig child none pig pig none
pig dog pig pig child none pig pig none
is that soft dog pig pig pig pig pig pig none
is that a puppet pig soft dog pig pig child pig pig pig none
love the pig dog pig pig pig pig dog none none
love the pig dog pig pig child none pig pig none
pigs say oink oink oink dog pig pig pig pig pig pig none
